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ABSTRACT 
 This research examined the correlation between maintainer experience and 
F/A-18 readiness and how it can be leveraged through the creation of a specialist rate 
from within the existing manpower structure. This approach was derived from the naval 
aviation maintenance community’s ongoing manpower deficiencies, which have led to a 
decline in the average years of experience in enlisted maintenance personnel. This 
experience issue is further complicated by rapid changes in technology. The resulting 
experience gap has placed an increased emphasis on training and a reliance on civilian 
contractors for technical expertise in order to reduce the impact on aircraft readiness. 
 Causal forecasting models were used to determine the existence of a significant 
positive correlation between experience and readiness. We accomplished this by focusing 
on two quantitative datasets that contain a detailed two-year historical compilation of 
aviation maintainer experience levels and readiness numbers of F/A-18 Super Hornet 
squadrons. We then explored ways to leverage experience in the Naval Aviation 
Enterprise by comparing current policy with historical approaches, specialization in the 
DOD, and industry practices.  
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Manpower deficiencies within naval aviation maintenance have led to a decline in 
the average years of experience among enlisted maintenance personnel. Rapid technology 
changes further complicate the experience decline, and the Navy’s response has been 
increased emphasis on training and reliance on civilian contractors for technical expertise 
to reduce the impact on aircraft readiness.  
The purpose of this research was to determine the correlation between the 
experience of aviation maintainers and squadron readiness in order to leverage the 
connection between them. The scope of our research was narrowed by limitations in 
available Aviation Maintenance Experience (AMEX) data, and as a result it focused 
exclusively on F/A-18 Super Hornets.  
We reviewed the education, training, and rank structure of aviation production 
ratings to establish a baseline for current methods of creating and utilizing experience for 
comparison with historical practices in the Navy, specialization throughout the DoD, and 
approaches from civilian industry. The AMEX system is described in detail to establish its 
role in measuring experience and explain its use in our regression models. Learning curve 
models are briefly discussed to emphasize the connection between task repetition and 
improved performance. Finally, emerging technology and how it relates to the aviation 
maintenance is provided prior to our analysis.  
Analysis focused on the relationship between aviation maintainer experience levels 
and readiness numbers of F/A-18 Super Hornet squadrons from August 2018 to August 
2020. We used multivariate linear regression models to determine the existence of a 
significant positive correlation between experience and readiness. We were able to show a 
highly significant correlation between the experience of aviation maintainers and squadron 
readiness rates, finding an AMEX coefficient of 5 percentage points on RBA rate while 




Table 1. Models 3, 4, and 5 
Model 3 4 5 
    
R Square 0.178 0.193 0.268 
Observations 708 708 708 
        
Parameter estimates       
       
Intercept 0.624*** 0.530***   
AMEX 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.059*** 
number_aircraft   0.009*** -0.002 
Basic     0.673*** 
Deployed     0.7515*** 
Integrated     0.706*** 
Maintenance      0.628*** 
Sustain     0.733*** 
        
Pr (>|t|) Significance Codes:  
*** = 0 to 0.001 / ** = 0.001 to 0.01 / * = 0.01 to 0.05 / . = 0.05 to 0.1 / blank = 0.1 to 1 
Findings were tested for fixed and random effects, and found that the answers were 
not quantitatively different, thus answering our primary research question by proving a 
correlation between experience and readiness exists.  
Research of industry and DoD methods of leveraging experience compared a wide 
variety of options, all of which utilized specialization in one form or another. Industry’s 
emphasis that not everyone needs to be a manager provides the flexibility to retain talented 
personnel with critical skills employed in critical areas where they are best utilized. The 
most relevant version of this is American Airlines’ technical crew chief, which consists of 
an experienced aviation technician whose entire career focuses solely on fixing aircraft and 
does not merge into management. This position provides the Naval Aviation Enterprise 
(NAE) with an active model to use as the basis for creating and using a specialist; while 
the Army’s historical use of a specialist rank provides an example of how to incorporate a 
specialist into our rank structure. 
xxi 
In our opinion, Naval Air Technical and Engineering Services Command (NATEC) 
represents the Navy’s current practice of leveraging experience; but it has notable 
constraints, which include limited availability during deployments. Figure 1 shows an 
upward trend in usage of NATEC by the Super Hornet community, and seems to indicate 
an increased need for experts with specialization.  
 
Figure 1.  NATEC Manhours for F/A-18E/F from 2008 to 2019. 
Source: Adapted from NATEC data (2020). 
Our recommendation is that the NAE invest in further research toward a cost-
benefit analysis of creating specialists that would be managed by NATEC and sent to 
squadrons with the exclusive intent of resolving complex aircraft issues without the 
limitations that deployment places on civilians. Selection as a specialist would be 
conducted through a highly competitive and incentivized screening process, which 
includes a one-year probationary trial period. Full designation would consist of assigning 
a closed loop Navy enlisted classification code with a high year tenure waiver and a rating 
change to either AV or AF depending on their previous rating.  
In short, our research found a significant correlation between aviation maintainer 
experience and aircraft readiness of CONUS based F/A-18 Super Hornet squadrons, then 
determined that the creation of a specialist rating, formed from within existing manpower, 
would be the best method of leveraging the correlation. Additionally, unlike many other 
plans that aim to do more with less, we propose doing more by restructuring what we 
already have available. 
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The Naval Aviation Maintenance community has struggled with proper manning 
levels for the last decade. Rapid technology changes have created gaps in experience levels, 
and the emergence of 5G, artificial intelligence, and machine learning are expected to 
accelerate this change, possibly moving faster than the Navy can train its Sailors. Billet 
Based Distribution (BBD) has taken aim at the manning issue; but, despite this effort, in 
the NAE squadrons rely heavily on contractors and technical representatives to bridge the 
technology gap and address the most pressing technological issues on aircraft. Contractors 
are associated with high cost and utilizing them becomes complicated when Air Wings are 
deployed to locations like the South China Sea where it is not optimal to receive parts or 
fly civilians to location. This complication is further compounded by the protective 
measures required during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
The authors of this MBA project are both Aviation Maintenance Duty Officers 
(AMDO) with a combined total of more than 30 years of enlisted and officer experience. 
They can attest to the challenges the naval aviation community faces in keeping pace with 
technology changes and attaining sufficient aircraft readiness numbers while constantly 
under manned and inadequately resourced. The NAE historically attributes readiness issues 
to improper manning levels or lack of availability for critical repair parts. However, it is 
the authors’ opinion that in addition to these well-known and researched issues there is an 
additional problem in how we utilize and manage the skills of our personnel. The NAE has 
some of the most talented technicians in the world, and research of this project identifies a 
connection between experience and readiness that can be leveraged to enhance the 
availability of the fleet.  
A review of various industry leaders found different approaches and methods, but 
all of them had a common thread to address manpower utilization. For example, Silicon 
Valley leadership focuses on management while its engineers and technology specialists 
focus on their area of expertise. This creates two separate career paths that both have the 
2 
same goal of providing the best possible end item for their company. If this is how current 
industry is leveraging their employee strengths, it is worth examining potential corollaries 
in the NAE. The Navy’s current promotion system takes technicians on a pathway that puts 
increasing emphasis on leadership and management skill over technical prowess. It 
assumes their current technical ability is a permanent baseline on which to build a 
technology adept leader and manager. This project addresses the unintended consequences 
of rewarding technicians at the peak of their proficiency with a management job. Not only 
do the technicians stop learning new technology enhanced by new skills, but also those 
older skills no longer reach the aircraft as frequently.  
What if, like civilian industry, the NAE developed a divergence in career paths that 
created two separate areas of emphasis? One being the traditional route that develops 
technicians into managers well versed in the aircraft and the other being a specialist route 
that continues to develop technicians’ technology-based maintenance acumen. Could 
leveraging the experience of maintenance personnel in this way solve the NAE’s perceived 
manning issues while simultaneously increase readiness? Before we can approach this 
question, we must first know the degree to which experience and readiness are connected.  
The overall assumption in the NAE is that higher experience levels of a squadron 
equate to higher readiness numbers. Standards are set on the minimum qualifications 
necessary for deployment that ensure sufficient experience is available within the 
squadron. Our primary question takes aim at this assumption and attempts to quantitatively 
answer it. If this assumption holds true, would creating a specialist career path to leverage 
experience lead to increased readiness? The NAE is challenged today by emerging 
technology such as artificial intelligence and unmanned aircraft, and at this juncture it is 
important to know the measurable degree to which experience matters on the flight line.  
B. PURPOSE 
The successes and failures in an organization can be traced back to decisions it 
made in the past, and we believe this is just as true for manpower as it is for any other 
variable. Recruiting and retaining the best and brightest individuals is an age-old challenge 
for any organization. Over the last few decades, the competition over personnel working 
3 
in cutting-edge, technology-based industries has been extremely fierce. Meanwhile the 
Navy has struggled to retain Sailors by using an ebb and flow of personnel cuts and 
incentives to balance manning levels, while doing very little to modernize how it  
utilizes Sailors. 
This MBA project investigates if experience matters in the increase or decrease of 
readiness of the Super Hornet Fleet. If this experience does matter and positive correlation 
is statistically viable, how then can the NAE better leverage that experience in the future? 
Looking to industry and other branches of the military, best practices were sought out in 
an attempt to identify opportunities to leverage talent. The benefit of this study is to 
ascertain whether business practices used by industry leaders to leverage the experience 
and skill sets of their personnel can or should be applied within the NAE. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Below are the questions this project attempts to answer: 
 Primary Research Question 
To what degree does the experience level of an aviation maintainer affect the 
readiness of an F/A-18 Super Hornet squadron?  
 Secondary Research Question 
How can we best leverage the connection between maintainer experience and 
readiness in terms of manpower in the aviation maintenance community?  
D. METHODOLOGY 
To answer the primary research question in this project, the authors investigate 
effects of experience levels on squadron readiness. Does the assumption of high levels of 
experience in squadron maintainers corelate in a positive manner to higher readiness levels 
in the F/A-18 Super Hornet community, or does the opposite hold true? CNAF-provided 
data is used to measure the degree to which a correlation exists or does not exist between 
experience levels and readiness numbers. Data is provided from the Aviation Maintainer 
4 
Experience (AMEX) and Aviation Material Readiness Reporting (AMSRR) databases, for 
the dates of August 2018–August 2020.  
Method: Compare and contrast individual F/A-18 squadron manning/experience 
scores, “AMEX score” from the AMEX database, with ready basic aircraft (RBA) 
percentages through Aviation Material Readiness Reporting (AMSRR). Pooled regression 
models of the data are used to statistically prove or disprove the primary research question. 
To answer the secondary research, question the authors researched industry best 
practices of leveraging talent and identify methods to incorporate in the NAE. Additionally, 
research is conducted on other military organizations that have utilized specialization of 
personnel such as the Army’s flying warrant program.  
Method: Qualitative research is conducted on published reports and data of 
personnel utilization practices by applicable industry leaders. Additionally, a combination 
of research and review of applicable service applications within the armed forces and their 
outcomes. Research on both approaches is used to drive a manpower recommendation of 
the creation of a specialist rating within the aviation maintenance community.  
E. ORGANIZATION 
The following is a brief description of the five chapters in which our research is 
presented. Chapter II is a literature review intended to provide the reader with sufficient 
background information on an aviation maintainer’s career structure, education, and 
qualifications in order to understand the lengthy nature of gaining subject matter expertise. 
This chapter also introduces the importance of emerging technologies focusing on 5G and 
the impact tech will have on the acceleration of changes. Lastly, Chapter II introduces the 
reader to the AMEX database and literature on the value of experience in personnel. 
Chapter III explains the quantitative analysis used by the authors to answer the project’s 
primary research question, “To what degree does the experience level of an aviation 
maintainer affect the readiness of an F/A-18 Super Hornet squadron?” We provide a 
detailed walkthrough of the regression models performed on datasets gathered from CNAF 
and NATEC to explain the correlation found between maintainer experience and readiness. 
Chapter IV answers the secondary question, “How can we best leverage the connection 
5 
between maintainer experience and readiness in terms of manpower in the aviation 
maintenance community?” This analysis takes a quantitative approach by looking at 
current NAE policy in comparison with civilian industry practices, historical naval 
approaches to changes in technology and manpower needs, and specialization attempts in 
other branches of the Department of Defense (DoD) in order to formulate a road map for 
future use. Chapter V, the final chapter, concludes the report as a summary of the project 
as a whole. The authors also provide recommendations based on their findings and suggest 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This focus of this project is maintainer experience, its connection to readiness, and 
how to leverage it. This chapter provides insight into how maintainer experience is created, 
managed, and evaluated by describing the training, tracking, and analyzing methods 
currently utilized by the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). This information serves as a 
basis for understanding experience as a cultivated and scarce resource that is analyzed in 
Chapter III. Finally, the chapter concludes with a description of major technology changes 
on the horizon, which will impact the NAE’s experience requirements.  
A. AVIATION MAINTENANCE SAILORS 
The following section describes the process that turns a Sailor who has recently 
graduated from basic training into a technician who specializes in aviation maintenance. It 
describes the rates employed by aviation maintenance, the standard training pipeline, a 
generalized career progression, and the force shaping measures used on manpower. In 
doing so, this section strives to describe how this process creates a vast network of 
experienced subject matter experts (SME) and how they are used to achieve aviation 
readiness standards. Understanding the process of how Sailors gain experience is an 
integral part of our analysis on the impact of experience on readiness, which will be 
discussed later in Chapter III.  
 Aviation Ratings 
For the purposes of this project, the description of rates employed in aviation 
maintenance will be limited to the rates measured in the AMEX system. Primarily, this 
means excluding the Aircrew Survival Equipmentman (PR) and Aviation Maintenance 
Administrationman (AZ) rates, but also excludes rates that have supporting roles like the 
Logistics Specialist (LS), Yeoman (YN), Personnel Specialist (PS), and Career Counselor 
(NC), all of which would be found at any fleet squadron. It also excludes aviation specific 
rates that are not utilized at the organization-level (O-level, i.e., a squadron). Some of these 
rates include the Aviation Support Equipment Technician (AS), the Air Traffic Controller 
(AC), and the Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (AB) to include its subspecialties. Each of these 
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rates play an important part in a squadron’s performance and are excluded here only due 
to the nature of the AMEX database used in our analysis (M. Pittner, PowerPoint slides, 
21 April 2019).  
The production ratings we focus our research on include the Aviation Machinist’s 
Mates (AD), Aviation Electrician’s Mates (AE), Aviation Structural Mechanics (AM), 
Aviation Structural Mechanic Safety Equipment (AME), Aviation Ordnancemen (AO), 
and Aviation Electronics Technicians (AT). A description of the responsibilities associated 
with the production rates is provided in the Appendix (Department of the Navy [DoN], 
2020a).  
Additionally, this project focuses on the ranks of E4 through E8 as those are the 
ranks that AMEX takes into consideration (M. Pittner, PowerPoint slides, 21 April 2019). 
Further explanation of the AMEX system is in Section D of this chapter. Attaining the rank 
of E4 marks the end of being an Airman and the entry into the petty officer paygrades 
(DoN, 2020a, p. 3). Petty officers’ rate and rank are commonly used in combination as a 
shorthand method that enables an individual to be identified quickly from among a group 
of Sailors. For example, “AD2” denotes a second-class petty officer in the aviation 
machinist’s mate rating. Petty officer ranks are from E4 to E6 and end once the rank of E7 
is attained and the Sailor becomes a Chief Petty Officer (DoN, 2020a, p. 3), commonly 
referred to as “Chief.” Likewise, when a Chief attains the rank of E8 and becomes a Senior 
Chief Petty Officer (DoN, 2020a, p. 3), commonly referred to as “Senior.”  
While these commonly used rank references use brevity to distinguish who is being 
spoken to, they also denote the level of experience the individual is assumed to possess. 
This is due to the average number of years it takes to attain the rank they have achieved. 
For instance, Figure 1 illustrates a typical career path for an AE or AT (DoN, 2020a, p. 
AE-4), while Figure 2 describes the time-in-rate (TIR) requirements for eligibility toward 
the next rank (Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel [CNP], 2018). As illustrated in Figure 
1, these two rates culminate in the rank of E9, or Master Chief Petty Officer, and merge 
both rates into AV, which indicates a Master Chief Avionics Technician (DoN, 2020a) 
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 Career Path for an AE and AT. Source: DoN (2020a, p. AE-4). 
 
 Basic Time-In-Rate (TIR) Requirements. 
Source: CNP (2018, p. 2–1). 
In a similar fashion, the rates of AD, AM, and AME are combined into AF at the 
rank of E9, which indicates a Master Chief Aircraft Maintenanceman (DoN, 2020a). 
Certain elements of career progression are based on meeting necessary time requirements, 
as shown in Figure 2 (CNP, 2018, 2–1), while others are subject to a multitude of factors 
like performance evaluation, individual test scores, current manpower requirements at a 
given rank of a specific rate, etc. However, in order to help facilitate realistic expectations 
for career progression Naval Personnel Command has published information on each rate 
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that allows the individual to monitor their progress in comparison with their peers. 
Providing Sailors with a method of examining their career progression allows them, and 
their mentors, to set goals they can attain in their pursuit of achieving milestones every step 
of the way. While this benefits the growth and success of the individual Sailor, the 
qualifications and experience they earn along the way will also develop them into a crucial 
asset that the Navy depends upon to maintain readiness standards.  
 Technical Education  
All enlisted Sailors attend indoctrination training at Naval Station Great Lakes. This 
training is focused on the basic fundamentals of being a Sailor, many of which are unique 
to the Navy among its fellow services, and provide the essential foundation for their ability 
to function with their fellow Sailors in the Fleet. All the skills they will need to perform 
aviation maintenance are provided after indoctrination training at schools specifically 
designed to toward that end.  
The Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training (CNATT) mission is to 
develop, deliver, and support aviation technical training necessary to meet 
validated Fleet requirements through a continuum of professional and 
personal growth for Sailors and Marines. (Naval Education and Training 
Command [NETC], 2020) 
This is done in either a formal school setting at CNATT training centers or in on-
the-job training (OJT) at the squadron. The schools are described below, and locations are 
detailed in Figure 3. 
The Pensacola-based headquarters is responsible for 28 sites located 
throughout the continental United States and Japan. CNATT with a staff of 
nearly 3,000, trains more than 97,000 students annually in the U.S. and 
abroad. The center is responsible for curriculum and educational tools, as 
well as developing training solutions and professional development for 
aviation ratings, airman, related aviation maintenance officer training and 
training for Marine Corps aviation Military Occupational Specialties 
requirements. (NETC, 2020) 
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 Center for Naval Aviation Technical Training Domain. 
Source: NETC (2020). 
 Apprentice “A” School 
Apprentice school, or “A” school as it is known, builds upon the foundation made 
at basic training and marks the beginning of the road toward becoming an SME. Sailors 
who attend this school are typically between the paygrades of E-1 through E-3 (DoN, 
2020b). Some “Fleet Returnees,” Sailors who opt to change their rate after time spent 
working in the Fleet, may be in the petty officer paygrades of E-4 or E-5. Undesignated 
strikers cannot attain the rank of petty officer until they obtain a rating by applying  
for it and only then can take the required examination for advancement to petty officer 
(DoN, 2020b).  
The skills learned at A-school are put to use at the squadron and built upon while 
performing OJT, which in addition to completing necessary maintenance tasks serves to 
reinforce and clarify lessons taught at A-school. This practice of using real maintenance 
tasks as teaching aids taught outside of the classroom is a proven method of showing new 
Sailors the practical application of techniques and situations. OJT is a staple in the process 
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of progression from apprentice to journeyman level personnel qualifications standards 
(PQS) and a successful method of showing undesignated strikers the skills of a rate in a 
real world setting prior to applying for that rating. 
 Career “C” School 
Career school, or “C” school as it is known, further builds upon the lessons learned 
while in “A” school and the OJT Sailors receive in the fleet. “C” school facilitates learning 
information unique to the aircraft at the squadron a Sailor has been assigned.  
Rated Sailors can attain a Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) which are additional 
codes to ratings that identify personnel and billets in terms of manpower (DoN, 2020b). 
These codes help Detailers and squadron Assistant Maintenance Officers (AMO) ensure 
the right personnel are assigned to their unit (DoN, 2020b). For example, NECs will help 
distinguish an AM3 who graduated with training focused toward maintenance on an F/A-
18 Super Hornet from another AM3 whose training focused on a MH-60S Knighthawk. In 
this example, both of the new third-class petty officers are trained in skills general to all 
aviation structural mechanics but graduating from a C-school and gaining an NEC 
identifies them with that particular aircraft. This can occur relatively early on in a Sailor’s 
career and if developed appropriately over the years it can result in a maintenance expert 
for that aircraft.  
 Advanced Skills Management 
Advanced Skills Management (ASM) is an online repository system that allows 
Navy leaders the ability to view and manage personnel data. The data stored in this system 
includes training, certifications, qualifications, and licenses that are used in the 
performance of daily maintenance tasks. A squadron’s ASM Coordinator serves as  
the point of contact for personnel who need access and will assist them in establishing  
an account.  
This system includes the ability to run various types of reports which give 
maintenance managers insight into the status of their department, division, or work center. 
One such report allows qualifications currently being pursued to be measured in terms of 
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percentage toward completion and progression made since the last report. This allows 
managers to keep Sailors accountable for required qualifications per their rating and current 
rank as well as help the squadron maintain a healthy maintenance department. It also allows 
managers to have control and oversight of the qualification process and ensure that once a 
Sailor receives a new qualification in ASM it is also added to NALCOMIS (OOMA). This 
allows the Sailor to sign for having completed maintenance actions logged in OOMA 
where the qualification is a prerequisite for signing. A cumulative list of qualified 
personnel is published in the Monthly Maintenance Plan (MMP) which is reviewed and 
routed through the Chain of Command monthly for accuracy and cohesion between the 
ASM and OOMA as they do not currently integrate with one another. Pen and ink changes 
are made between revisions to ensure the qualifications in ASM, OOMA, and the MMP 
are constantly in alignment. These changes are due to qualifications being continually 
achieved by personnel on a continual basis and the unit’s desire to employ a Sailor’s new 
qualification as soon as possible. Putting a qualification to use as soon as it is achieved has 
a dual benefit of maximizing opportunities to gain further proficiency and immediately 
increasing the number of available Sailors with that qualification. If this qualification was 
the current bottleneck in the Maintenance Department, the benefit of putting it to use right 
away versus waiting until the next month’s review is self-evident. ASM as a method for 
electronically managing qualifications is a vast improvement over the paper-training 
jackets previously used to manage a Sailor’s record of qualifications. This system of 
tracking qualifications allows each Sailor’s record to easily be updated and follow them 
throughout their career.  
 High Year Tenure  
High year tenure is a term that describes a condition in which a Sailor has failed to 
advance to the next paygrade above their current one during a specified allotted timeline. 
Details of the policy are listed in the Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN) 1160–
120 (Department of the Navy [DoN], 2018b).  
The high year tenure (HYT) policy is a vital and effective force 
management tool utilized to properly size and shape the Active Component 
(AC) and the Reserve Component (RC). HYT management is regulated by 
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establishing standardized length- of-service (LOS) gates by pay grade 
balanced with a waiver process to enable the Navy to retain the right number 
of members. As one of the Navy’s key enlisted force management tools, the 
HYT policy facilitates viable career paths and advancement opportunities 
across all pay grades and LOS spectrums. The standardized HYT gates 
allow members greater flexibility to stay Navy within a stabilized force. 
Through this measured process, the Navy enhances quality throughout the 
continuum of service. (DoN, 2018b) 
Updates and revisions occur as necessary to align this management method to the 
realities of current manning levels. The most recent change to the HYT thresholds 
associated with each paygrade was May 18, 2018 (Military Personnel Message 1160–120, 
2018). The current policy for maximum years of service for active component (AC) and 
full-time support (FTS) personnel is as follows in Table 1.  
Table 1. Maximum Years of Service for AC and FTS. Source: DoN (2018b). 
 
 
There are many reasons high year tenure is important which this project will not 
fully address. We address it here to describe one way in which the Navy loses experienced 
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Sailors. Unless a waiver is approved personnel can only re-enlist or extend their current 
tour up to their HYT date for their current paygrade, and this has additional stipulations 
based on rate. Various force shaping methods have been tried in recent decades and are 
often counter balanced by a selective re-enlistment bonus (SRB) or other means of 
retaining Sailors once the force shaping has cut too deep into specific rates. 
B. AVIATION MAINTAINER EXPERIENCE  
 Background 
Naval Air Forces has struggled to measure manning in a manner able to quantify 
the experience and qualifications. In 2014 the NAE Total Force Cross Functional Team 
(CFT) implemented the Aviation Maintainer Experience (AMEX) metric as an answer to 
this dilemma (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019). In 2016, after an initial run 
and early support from leadership, the NAE pushed to invest more in the system and 
improve its summary of experience levels in a squadron in the hopes of becoming a 
predictor of readiness (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019). This tool allowed 
TYCOMs to quickly identify and act upon manning and experience shortfalls across the 
flight line. Today’s AMEX gives squadrons quantitative data that reflect the qualifications 
and experience of an enlisted maintainer. This data is summarized in the squadron’s overall 
AMEX score. This score has helped TYCOMs and Air Wings better manage their 
squadrons by giving them a tool that reflects the readiness of their manning. It has also 
allowed leadership to identify weaker squadrons on the flight line and move qualified 
maintainers from other squadrons to the ones in need in order to better balance overall 
manning (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019).  
Why is there a need for AMEX when the Navy has the FIT/FILL system to identify 
manning shortages? While the FIT/FILL system does identify manning shortages, the 
system does not consider type model series (TMS) experience and qualifications (FIT/
FILL, PowerPoint slides, n.d.). FILL measures a unit’s personnel currently onboard to its 
funded billets and FIT measures the specific “FIT” of Sailors in a unit considering pay 
band, NEC, and rating match (FIT/FILL, PowerPoint slides, n.d.). While FIT/FILL is a 
good metric of a squadron’s number of personnel onboard that it is funded too, it does not 
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consider experience or qualifications which can be a good indicator to a units’ readiness 
overall. Also, the numbers of FIT/Fill are reliant on billets being funded, which is usually 
lower than the Navy Manpower Analysis Centers (NAVMAC) manpower requirement 
documents for a squadron (FIT/FILL, PowerPoint slides, n.d.).  
AMEX has become the answer for the NAE to better manage manning and consider 
the information FIT/FILL does not provide. AMEX is not meant to be a replacement for 
FIT/FILL methods, but instead is being used as a supplement by detailers, squadron AMOs, 
and leadership.  
 Definitions 
 DEMOT  
DEMOT is the acronym used to encompass all the rates measured in AMEX (M. 
Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019). Each letter in DEMOT represents the last letter 
in the maintainers rate; for example, the D in DEMOT refers to the D in AD of the 
abbreviation for an aviation machinist’s mate. As previously mentioned in this chapter 
there are more jobs or rates in a typical squadron then the DEMOT rates, but AMEX only 
takes into consideration these rates because they are product rates considered critical to 
maintenance in a squadron and can be measured through qualifications (M. Pittner, 
PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019). See the Appendix for a full description of the rates that 
comprise DEMOT.  
 Deployment and Hard Deck  
Deployment and hard deck are terms used to describe the lower and higher 
thresholds that have been determined by SMEs and TYCOM Maintenance Officers (M. 
Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019).  
The Deployment threshold is applicable in the Basic through Sustainment 
phases (does not apply to Maintenance phase, as illustrated by the dashed 
segment of the Deployment line). An AMEX score above the Deployment 
threshold implies a unit can accomplish all assigned tasking/missions 
without external maintenance assistance (e.g., TAD assist, sister squadron 
assistance). (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019) 
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Hard Deck—An AMEX score below the Hard Deck implies a unit is no 
longer capable of safely conducting two-shift maintenance and is designed 
to trigger immediate Wing/CNAP/CNAL N13 manning actions (e.g., divert, 
TAD assist) to ensure aircrew Air Combat Training Continuum (ACTC) 
readiness development is not interrupted. (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 
21 April 2019)  
These readiness thresholds give AMEX users an easy-to-use chart when comparing 
fleet squadrons to each other and it allows for an easy identification of a squadron’s 
readiness to deploy or operate. Figure 4 is a snapshot of this chart from the database.  
 
 AMEX Star Chart for Month of August 2020. 
Source: AMEX Database (2020). 
 Source Data  
Naval aviation is rich with data and typically new measurement systems require 
new ways of collecting data and places another burden on the fleet. However, AMEX is 
different in that it uses existing data already being collected and combines it to create a 
picture of manning readiness. AMEX takes the input from ASM and uses this information 
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in its calculation of an individual Sailor’s AMEX score (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 
April 2019). AMEX also uses the Navy Enlisted System (NES) as an input for information 
on a Sailor’s past duty stations and is used in the calculation of points for TMS experience 
(M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019). 
 Method  
“AMEX is derived from NAVMAC requirements and SME-determined qual need” 
(FIT/FILL PowerPoint slides, p. 12), to populate the specific manning requirements for 
squadrons. AMEX only takes into consideration the paygrades of E4 thru E8 and DEMOT 
rates in its calculation (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019). 
A squadron’s finalized AMEX score is derived from the total sum of individual 
Sailor AMEX scores (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019), and each individual 
Sailor is given an AMEX score based on an architecture of logic trees, as shown in Figure 
5. These logic trees are broken down by paygrade and TMS. Combined information about 
a Sailor’s qualifications and their TMS experience produce an individual score. Production 
qualifications, for example Collateral Duty Inspector (CDI) and Safe for Flight (SFF), give 
the Sailor points per the logic tree. The logic tree does not take into consideration Sailor 
NECs. Experience points are derived from NES history for an individual Sailor for any 
relevant past TMS commands. Those scores from the logic tree are then weighted 
differently depending on paygrade according to the AMEX outcomes and points matrix. 
This matrix gives the final points outcome for a maintainer. (For an example of a points 




 AMEX Score Logic Tree. Source: M. Pittner, 
PowerPoint Slides (2019).  
After individual Sailor’s scores are calculated those scores are funneled into their 
home units; the sum of the individual scores equals the total AMEX points for an entire 
squadron (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 2019). Let us look at a simplified 
example to explain: If VFA-105 has a total of 100 DEMOT Sailors, each with an individual 
AMEX score of 5 points, then the unit points total for VFA-105 would be 500. Figure 6 
shows an example of unit points total.  
 
 Unit Points Total Example. Source (NAE, 2018, p. 3) 
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The AMEX unit point totals are one way to see if squadrons meet the thresholds of 
Deployment or Hard Deck. However, unit totals are not perfectly suited for comparing 
Super Hornet squadrons to each other since not every F/A-18 squadron is manned equally 
due to there being two variants, the F/A-18E and F/A-18F, and the number of jets assigned 
can vary as well. NAVMAC takes this into account when developing the manning 
footprint. However, this creates a problem when comparing total Unit Points from 
squadron to squadron. To solve this issue the program developers, take the unit points total 
of a squadron and convert them into AMEX scores (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 21 April 
2019). See Figure 7 for the calculation method, Figure 8 for an example of point totals 
converted to an AMEX score, and Figure 9 for an example of a points matrix. These AMEX 
scores are what will be used in the regression models for this MBA project. “To conduct 
an “apples-to-apples” AMEX comparison (chart plots) between dissimilar TMS, and 
dissimilar units within a TMS (e.g., 10 PMAA FA-18E and 12 PMAA FA-18E), the 
AMEX points are normalized to calculate an AMEX score” (M. Pittner, PowerPoint Slides, 
21 April 2019). 
 
 




 AMEX Unit Points/Scores Summary for March 2020. 
Source: AMEX Data (2020). 
21 
 
 AMEX Outcomes and Points. Source: M. Pittner, 
PowerPoint Slides (2019).  
C. EXPERIENCE 
 Mishaps 
One way in which the effect of experience has been measured and studied is in 
terms of how it relates to mishaps. In November of 2018, the Center for Naval Analyses 
(CNA) published a study that investigated the impact that experience levels of E5 
supervisors, in terms of years of service (YOS), would have on the likelihood of a mishap 
occurring (Nguyen, 2018). The study was done at the request of CNAF and focused 
exclusively on data from Strike Fighter Squadrons (VFA) since in addition to having the 
largest number of aircraft in the NAE, they also account for over 40 percent of the mishaps 
in their data (Nguyen, 2018). The data they analyzed in Figure 10 was from 2011 to 2016 
and, “found a correlation (with a 95 percent confidence level) between mishap probability 
and supervisor fit percentage and E5 years of service by using a logistic regression model.” 
(Nguyen, 2018)  
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 Scatter Plot of Raw FY11- FY16 Mishap Data. 
Source: Nguyen (2018). 
The data show that from FY 2011 to FY 2016 the average YOS of an E5 supervisor 
had decreased by 1.5 percent and that the supervisor FIT percentage had decreased by 
4 percent, as shown in Figure 11 (Nguyen, 2018). They determined that these covariates 
were non-linear and used a multivariable logistic regression model to better fit the 
information available (Nguyen, 2018).  
 
 FY11–FY16 Averages: E5 LOS and Supervisor Fit %.  
Source: Nguyen (2018).  
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Figure 12 illustrates two mishap probability curves. The red curve shows supervisor 
fit at 75 percent while the green curve shows supervisor fit at 86 percent (Nguyen, 2018). 
In both curves the supervisor fit is shown against the E5 LOS and all the information is 
taken directly from the data depicted in the Figure 10 scatter plot (Nguyen, 2018). These 
two levels reflect the CNAF goal of 86 percent and the year-to-date average of 75 percent 
for FY 2017 (Nguyen, 2018).  
 
 Mishap Probability of Supervisor Fit at 75% and 86%. 
Source: Nguyen (2018). 
The CNA study was unable to conclusively determine mishap probability on the 
basis of the experience and FIT of an E5 supervisor, however, they did find sufficient 
statistical correlations for them to make recommendations toward an average YOS and 
supervisor fit that CNAF could use to decrease mishap rates (Nguyen, 2018).  
Due to the complexity of the problem, we can neither understand fully nor 
derive the impact on mishap probability of the changes in the covariates. 
However, because of the statistically significant correlations between 
mishap probability and the covariates mentioned above, we can rely on 
historical data and recommend that CNAF strive for around 9 YOS for E5s 
and 80 percent of supervisor fit to reduce the mishap rate to 10 mishaps per 
100,000 flight hours, matching the lower FY 2012 mishap rate. (Nguyen, 
2018) 
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The CNA study concluded by making a series of recommendations, which included 
looking at the number of executed flight hours in future studies since they found that low 
flying activity impacts mishap probability (Nguyen, 2018). This study was concluded in 
November of 2018 and aligns with a statement made in June of the same year regarding 
mishaps. Rear Admiral Roy Kelly, commander of Naval Air Forces Atlantic, said in his 
opening statement before the House Armed Services readiness subcommittee, “We have 
determined from the Naval Safety Center and the Center for Naval Analyses damage 
sustained during maintenance is the leading cause of these mishaps, with the analysis 
pointing towards maintainers that are less experienced” (Eckstein, 2018b). 
At that time in question concerns over the Navy’s Class C mishap rate were due to 
an unexplained increase see Figure 13. Class C mishaps involve $50,000 to $500,000 in 
damages to aircraft or a nonfatal injury and had doubled from 2012 to 2018 (Eckstein, 
2018b). 
 
 USN 10-Year Class C Mishap Rates. 
Source: Eckstein (2018a). 
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Rear Admiral Mark Leavitt told USNI News that the largest number of mishaps are 
occurring in naval aviation’s largest communities in terms of density of squadrons and 
aircraft (Eckstein, 2018a).  
The bulk of these mishaps occur during maintenance evolutions and involve 
aircraft striking or being struck by other objects. Multiple discrete studies 
from numerous sources point to inexperience in the E-5 and E-6 maintainer 
rates as a significant contributing factor. (Eckstein, 2018a) 
Despite his comment on the linkage between inexperienced maintainers and ground 
mishaps Rear Admiral Leavitt stated before the House Armed Services tactical air and land 
forces subcommittee that there is no correlation between flight hours and the rate of 
mishaps (Eckstein, 2018a); however, his statement was made in June of 2018 prior to the 
release of the CNA study in November of 2018. We find the discussion of flight hours 
intriguing since increased flying results in increased maintenance actions, which in turn 
result in more opportunities for maintainers to put their skills to work and gain experience.  
In his 2018 comments to USNI News Rear Admiral Kelly mentioned the AMEX 
program, which was still relatively new at the time, and plays a key role in our research.  
The difference in the enlisted experience that we have in E-5s, E-6s, is about 
a year and a half short of what it used to be 10 years ago. So, to give you an 
example, if you had an E-6 that 10 years ago in the same timeframe in their 
career had 11-and-a-half years of experience, today they would have 10 
years. So that difference. Also, the fact that we have people that are being 
assigned, they have helicopter backgrounds and they’re going to F-18 
squadrons or vice versa. We’re now clarifying specific qualifications at the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel through this AMEX program. (Eckstein, 2018b) 
As alluded to by Rear Admiral Kelly in the quote above, maintenance actions 
require the individual performing them to hold specific qualifications prior to executing 
those tasks.  
In order to attain a new maintenance qualification a Sailor will perform a series of 
specific tasks associated with the qualification they are pursing in repetition under the 
guidance of a supervisor who is already qualified to perform that same task. A signature 
by a qualified individual is required to prove that each of the assigned tasks were properly 
carried out. It should be noted here that a Sailor pursing a new qualification will have 
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practiced the tasks under the guidance of a qualified mentor to gain proficiency before 
requesting the required signature that asserts their competence in the task. ASM provides 
an electronic record that tracks the progress toward attaining the qualification and uses that 
record to prove that the Sailor pursuing the qualification has attained the degree of 
knowledge and proficiency required to perform the task on their own. Once they have 
performed all the required tasks and received the associated signatures, the Maintenance 
Officer (MO) will signed off on the approval of their qualification. This new qualification 
will stay on record in ASM and be added to NALCOMIS (OOMA) as required.  
This short description of how a Sailor attains maintenance qualifications is meant 
to further explain the link between flight hours and qualifications. A squadron that is 
steadily executing flight hours will have more opportunities for maintenance qualifications 
to be both attained and utilized. Routinely performing maintenance actions ensures a 
Sailor’s qualifications are being exercised. Long periods of not utilizing a qualification can 
lead to atrophy in both knowledge and acumen in the performance of the associated task to 
varying degrees for each individual Sailor. The Navy acknowledges this fact by requiring 
periodic assessments of all qualifications to ensure proficiency standards for retaining the 
qualification. Sailors who underperform risk losing their qualification until they can prove 
their ability to a qualified evaluator. 
 Learning Curve 
Although learning curves are not the focus of the research in this project, the authors 
want to briefly address them since they affect the analysis of methods that leverage 
experience as a resource. Therefore, the rate at which individuals gain proficiency at 
performing any given task must be included in this discussion of how experience of a 
maintenance rated Sailor impacts readiness. The words learning and experience are 
occasionally used interchangeably and shift when the description changes from a micro to 
a macro concept with learning describing the micro and experience describing the macro 
(Martin, n.d.). “The term experience curve relates to the total production, or the total output 
of any function such as manufacturing, marketing, or distribution” (Martin, n.d.) 
Regardless of which concept is being described, the fundamental concept of the learning 
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or experience curve is that the required amount of time to complete a task will decrease as 
a worker’s experience increases (Martin, n.d.).  
The basic concept is that the time, or cost, of performing a task  
(e.g., producing a unit of output) decreases at a constant rate as cumulative 
output doubles. Learning curves are useful for preparing cost estimates, 
bidding on special orders, setting labor standards, scheduling labor 
requirements, evaluating labor performance, and setting incentive wage 
rates. (Martin, n.d.)  
There are two models for measuring learning curves. The first was developed by T. 
P. Wright in 1936 and the second was developed by a team of researchers at Stanford 
University and is known as the Crawford Model (Martin, n.d.). Wright’s cumulative 
average model function is described as Y = aXb, shown in Figure 14, where Y is the 
cumulative average time (or cost) per unit, X is the cumulative number of units produced, 
a is the time (or cost) required to produce the first unit, and b is the slope of the function 
(Martin, n.d.).  
 
 Wright’s Learning Curve Model. 
Source: Martin (n.d.) 
Crawford’s incremental unit time (or cost) model is described as Y = aKb where Y 
is the incremental unit time (or cost) of the lot midpoint and K is the algebraic midpoint of 
a specific production batch or lot (Martin, n.d.). However, since the relationships are non-
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linear the following equation in Figure 15 must be solved to find the algebraic midpoint 
(Martin, n.d.).  
 
Once Yc is determined for the algebraic midpoint of a lot, then the cost of the entire lot is 
found by multiplying Yc by the number of units in the lot as indicated above. 
 
 Algebraic Midpoint Equation in Crawford’s Model. 
Source: Martin (n.d.)  
In short, the main difference between the two models is the use of incremental unit 
time in Crawford’s model and cumulative average time in Wright’s model, although 
Crawford’s model is more commonly used (Martin, n.d.).  
Learning curve impact will be further explored in Chapter IV, but as a segue into 
the next topic consider that learning curve models assume a specific task or series of tasks 
are being performed by the same worker or type of worker with a similar skillset. In order 
to optimize the benefit of the learning curve it follows that the task being performed is 
associated with the job description of the worker performing it. To do otherwise and inject 
a worker that is unfamiliar with the task being performed would reset the learning curve at 
its beginning state. So, in a broad sense we are describing the rating system the Navy uses 
to specialize its Sailors in order to maximize the return on investment it has placed in each 
one through various levels of training and years of performing job-specific tasks on a 
particular aircraft.  
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D. 5G 
Research in this project is not about the newest technology coming to market; it is 
about experience and how best to leverage that experience. However, the speed of 
technology change is an important factor as to why experience of a maintainer may be so 
critical when looking for ways to stay ahead of this technology curve. The Navy must set 
up its talent to best embrace and deploy the newest technology. Tech has been changing at 
a rapid pace, and a mere two decades ago many could not imagine a world where unlimited 
information would be available in an affordable device carried in a pocket. The Navy is 
keenly aware of the buzz words of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 
autonomous vehicles, and it is hungry to adopt and embrace these technologies. However, 
there are many questions as to how best to go about it, and they are the same ones many 
businesses and industries are facing. The trapped value or return on investment (ROI) of 
investing in technology is very difficult to realize and therefore makes it difficult to know 
how to properly invest in it (Abbosh & Downes, 2019).  
One emerging technology stands out from the rest, one that is destined to be an 
enabler of all other technologies coming online. Fifth generation technology for mobile 
networks, better known as 5G, is poised to change the way the world does business. 
Banking, manufacturing, healthcare, military, and many more are expected to be so 
transformed by 5G that it is hard to predict what that transformation will look like; and s 
for the military this includes how war will look two decades from now. 5G will not make 
the world is live in virtual reality, but will instead change the way people are able to 
exchange data, speeding up the process significantly (Brown, 2020). 
The predecessors of 5G can be linked to much of the technology taken for granted 
today. There have been several innovations to include mobile phone web browsing, 
multimedia, and navigation since 3G was widely available in the early 2000s (White 
House, 2019). Phones today have the capability of computers and information moves at a 
breakneck pace. Innovations are changing the way Americans conduct life every day from 
asking “Alexa” for a morning news up-date to having all the answers to the world at one’s 
fingertips with a simple Google search. There has also been a financial effect; in 2016 4G 
added $100 billion to U.S. GDP according to the White House (White House, 2019, p ii). 
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5G is expected to accelerate technology even further than its predecessors with the 
expectation that the network will be 100 times faster than current 4G networks (Brown, 
2020). The higher speeds and lower latency are expected to significantly reduce the lag 
time between when a device asks for information and when it receives it, which creates a 
higher connectivity between people and means more people can be working on the most 
pressing and complicated issues (Brown, 2020). This increased speed is expected to change 
things in artificial intelligence, virtual reality, drone technology, autonomous vehicles, or 
what is becoming known as the “internet of things” (Brown, 2020). 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) stresses the importance of technology being 
adapted within the military calling for agencies to, “work with industry to experiment, 
prototype, and rapidly field new capabilities that can be easily upgraded as new 
technologies come online” (White House, 2017, p. 29). Considered critical by President 
Trump, he laid out the importance of being world leaders in emerging technology such as 
artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles by making it a national priority to build 5G 
infrastructure to increase national competitiveness (White House, 2017, pp. 19, 20). 
In a Naval Postgraduate School interview of two Cyber Command leaders, General 
Keith Alexander and Vice Admiral Jan Tighe discussed the effects 5G will have on the 
military and advised students on actions that should be taken by the services. Both stressed 
the impact 5G will have on the speed of new capabilities coming to market and emphasized 
the importance of a strong partnership between industry and military in addressing 
emerging technologies, to embrace the benefits they can have on capabilities to outpace 
competition (Alexander & Tighe, 2020).  
While disruptive technologies can always lead to company collapse for 
those not agile enough to recognize and act upon the disruptive effects, I 
view these advances as all upside. As far as military applications go, we 
must position ourselves to take advantage of 5G in all the applications that 
commercial industries forge, but also in ways that we are uniquely equipped 
to implement, such as greater precision and lethality in warfighting. 
(Alexander & Tighe, 2020, paragraph 2)  
Embracing the newest technology is important to the military, but rarely taught in 
the naval education system. This may be due to what is considered by some as an old and 
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inadequate education system that rarely changes at the pace of technology. The Education 
for Seapower (E4S) final report observed that the need to have an education system that is 
more adaptive to emerging technologies (Department of the Navy [DoN], 2018a).  
Necessary teachings of advanced technology in strategic education 
curricula are haphazard and randomly pursued, made more difficult by the 
Department’s decentralized approach to education, as well as the lack of 
adequate time and means provided in naval careers (both enlisted and 
officer) to attain such education. (DoN, 2018a, p. 6) 
The E4S points out the importance of training our best and brightest officers and 
enlisted with the latest innovations and addresses emerging technology as a national 
security threat (DoN, 2018a). Furthermore, it emphasizes how ill prepared the Navy and 
Marine Core are in getting ready to adapt the newest technology, see Figure 16 for an 
example of what a future squadron may look like. 
Changes in society, technology, and our security environment are occurring 
at a rapid pace. Failure to adapt all aspects of how we prepare our naval 
leaders for the future creates unacceptable risk for American citizens, who 
have long relied on the Naval Services to be at the intellectual forefront of 
national security concerns. The Naval Services must learn from the history 
of war, as it teaches that when the equilibrium between the character 
(technology and tactics) and nature (human role) of war is upset, strategic 
surprise is often the result. (DoN, 2018a, p. 11) 
 
 Boeing’s Loyal Wingman Prototype UAV. 
Source: Reim (2020). 
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Relating this back to the research of this project, the question is what will these 
technology changes bring to the NAE? The answer is nobody knows entirely, but some of 
those changes are already here and others are swiftly approaching. At the end of 2019, 
Boeing demonstrated the capability of an EA-18G Growler to fly while autonomously 
controlling two other Growlers in mid-air, demonstrating what the future may look like for 
a squadron. A future where a pilot in one jet can be in control of several drones at the same 
time completely changes the definition of air superiority (Reim, 2020). This technology is 
not far off from being an everyday reality and opens the door to several other advances the 
Navy will need to adopt to outpace competition.  
All of the warfare communities of both the Navy and Marine Corps face the 
technological challenges of integrating unmanned and autonomous systems 
into their daily operations. The requirement to understand and employ 
cybernetics, artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and robotics will 
only accelerate. (DoN, 2018a, p. 32) 
Knowing that emerging technologies sped up by 5G will create a disruptive 
environment, the president is addressing it as a national security concern, and military 
leaders are emphasizing the importance of adapting and learning this new technology; the 
question becomes not just how but who should focus their attention toward answering the 
inevitable problems the NAE will have in merging new technology into our current 
capabilities?  
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, the Navy puts enlisted Sailors through extensive training to prepare 
them in the specific field required by their rating. Multiple levels of formal schools exist 
to provide training appropriate to the level and aptitude needed by squadrons from 
individual Sailors at different points in their careers. This training is an investment that is 
expected to return higher performance from the Sailors who go through it. Initial formal 
training serves as the cornerstone on which they build experience gained by OJT in the 
fleet while subsequent schools expand on key areas necessary for the Sailor’s development 
within their rating. The rates that currently serve in Naval Aviation are not static but exist 
as a reflection of the necessary specializations that are currently employed with today’s 
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technology. Changes to ratings are made as deliberate responses to needs of the Navy and 
often take years to fully implement. This concept will be further discussed in Chapter IV. 
AMEX is the current database in the NAE that best measures the experience and 
qualifications of an aviation maintainer. This system allows leadership to see how prepared 
for operations a squadron may be through measuring the experience and qualifications of 
Sailors, unlike FIT/FILL which shows manning numbers in relation to funded billets. 
Experience matters. Naval aviation has had its fair share of issues with mishaps, 
and experience of supervisors may be a contributing factor to this according to the CNA. 
Also, proven through the learning curve model we see that to be proficient at something an 
individual must repeat a process over and over (experience); when they reach the peak of 
the model only then can they be considered experienced and proficient.  
Lastly, emerging technologies are here and are already changing how war is fought. 
5G will accelerate this technology change significantly over the years to come due to the 
lower latency times and the ease of transferring large amounts of data. To better prepare 
for this inevitable technology change the NAE must educate its personnel in order to keep 
pace with the changes or risk falling behind in the great power competition.  
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. AMEX SCORE AND RBA COMPARISON 
 Data Collection and Preparation 
Thanks to support from CNAF and NATEC, we were able to get data from August 
2018 through August 2020 on monthly AMEX scores and daily AMSRR reports. We chose 
to analyze this data using linear regression models since it would allow us to determine the 
statistical relationship that exists between our variables (Balakrishnan et al., 2013).  
Our primary research question is, to what degree does the experience level of an 
aviation maintainer affect the readiness of an F/A-18 Super Hornet squadron? This 
question inherently makes squadron readiness the dependent variable and aviation 
maintenance experience the independent variable. We took squadron readiness from the 
AMSRR data and aviation maintenance experience from the AMEX data. We decided to 
start with a univariate regression model of the two variables to determine the basic level of 
their relationship and move forward with multiple regression models afterward.  
In order to perform analysis, we first had to prepare the data so that the end of 
month summary for AMEX would align with the material condition of all aircraft reported 
daily in AMSRR. For the purposes of our analysis we are using the term Ready Basic 
Aircraft (RBA) to also include the condition Full Mission Capable (FMC). This was done 
so we could make the conditions binary, up, or down, and since the term Ready for Tasking 
(RFT) was not used in the CNAF data set. We then took the daily AMSRR reports and 
used them to make an average RBA for each month. Additionally, the AMEX score is 
reported on the first of the month as a summary of the previous month’s numbers. As such 
we shifted the AMEX data back by one month in order to use it as a reflection of the month 
it was summarizing. For example, September 1st AMEX scores were compared to the 
entire month of August’s readiness numbers. This gave us two variables that described the 
monthly behavior of the squadron, the first in terms of average monthly experience of the 
maintainers in each squadron, and the second in terms of an average monthly readiness at 
each squadron.  
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 Single Regression  
We use Microsoft Excel’s data analysis add-in to perform a univariate regression 
on the two columns of data. This applies the formula 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 
expected value of RBA rate for squadron i during month t. The Y-intercept is b0, and b1 is 
the slope of the line (Balakrishnan et al., 2013). The dependent variable was the monthly 
RBA average of every VFA squadron from August 2018 to August 2020, and the 
independent variable is the monthly AMEX score of those same squadrons. The result of 
this is Model 1, seen in Table 2 below. 
 Multiple Regression 
In our first version of our multiple regression model, referred to as Model 2 in Table 
2, we added the average number of aircraft per squadron as a second independent variable, 
or covariate. The average number of aircraft, termed “number_aircraft” in the tables below, 
took into account when aircraft are in an Out of Reporting (OOR) status or are being 
swapped between squadrons, both of which make the number of aircraft reported that 
month fluctuate. This number helped us account for when an aircraft goes through a 
planned maintenance interval (PMI) or other occasion when the maintenance personnel 
assigned to the squadron do not work on that aircraft for a temporary amount of time 
(Commander, Naval Air Forces, 2017). By including a second independent variable we 
were able to determine how much of the correlation between RBA and AMEX from the 
single regression model could be attributed to the new variable. The process of using 
Excel’s data analysis add-in was the same with the exception of adding the additional 
variable. The formula inside the function changed to 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏2𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where 
X1it is the AMEX score for squadron i during month t, and X2it is the number of aircraft for 
squadron i during month t.  
To briefly recap, we first started with the entire prepared dataset of AMEX and 
RBA data of all geographic areas and operational phases. We fit a univariate model, Model 
1, and then add the number of aircraft as a covariate, Model 2, as shown in Table 2 and 
displayed in Figure 17. 
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Table 2. Models 1 and 2 
Model 1 2 
      
R Square 0.138 0.173 
Observations 852 852 
      
Parameter estimates     
      
Intercept 0.631*** 0.662*** 
AMEX 0.090*** 0.091*** 
number_aircraft   -0.003*** 
      
Pr (>|t|) Significance Codes:  




 Model 1 Scatterplot.  Source: Director, Force Readiness 
Analytics Group, email to author, June, 26, 2020. 
Our initial take-away was that commonality existed among the models. We then fit 
modes with squadron fixed effects and random effects to test the validity of our models 
and found that the results were not qualitatively different. The models consistently showed 
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a correlation. Every unit increase in AMEX score was associated with an increase in RBA 
rate of 8 or 9 percentage points. We display the results for the pooled models for simplicity.  
Further scrutiny of the data led us to reconsider which squadrons to include. We 
had been supplied AMEX and AMSRR for every VFA squadron, which meant that data 
included Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) and squadrons based in Japan.  
An FRS is vastly larger in size than a typical fleet squadron, both in assigned aircraft 
and manpower, and its mission is different as well. Unlike a fleet squadron, which focuses 
on planning and executing tactical-level missions in support of theater-specific operations, 
an FRS focuses on training newly qualified pilots in how to fly the specific aircraft they’ve 
been selected to fly in the fleet. Additionally, an FRS can be called upon as necessary to 
replace an aircraft in a fleet squadron due to unforeseen complications that cannot be 
repaired at the operational level of maintenance, for example, if an aircraft severely catches 
on fire. The FRS swaps one of their RBA aircraft for the fleet aircraft with the problem  
in order to facilitate the fleet squadron’s operations. Lastly, unlike a fleet squadron,  
the manpower at an FRS is not solely made up of Sailors but also includes civilian 
contractors. All these factors convolute the analysis, so we removed the FRS squadrons 
from the data set.  
Fleet squadrons based in Japan do not go through a typical five-stage cycle that 
includes Basic, Deployment, Sustainment, Maintenance, and Integration. They do a 
truncated version that only includes a repeated cycle of Deployment and Sustainment. 
Additionally, since they are Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) they have a higher 
Force Activity Designator (FAD) than squadrons in the continental United States 
(CONUS), which means it has a higher priority for personnel manning levels and logistics 
support. As with the FRS, we decided that these factors made squadrons outside the 
continental United States (OCONUS) different enough from the majority that we also 
removed their information from the data set.  
As a result, we created Models 3 and 4, seen below in Table 3, which are essentially 
the same as Models 1 and 2, respectively, with the exception of having the FRS and 
OCONUS squadrons removed. When we ran Models 3 and 4, the coefficient on AMEX 
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was consistently around 9 to 10 percentage points, which is similar to where it was 
previously but with a slight increase.  
In our second version of the multiple regression model, referred to as Model 5 in 
Table 3 and displayed in Figure 18, we built upon the first version by adding operational 
phases as additional covariates and once again tested them with fixed effects and random 
effects. The goal for running this model was to test the coefficient of AMEX on the RBA 
rate by seeing how much could be attributed to covariates that dictate much of the way a 
squadron operates. A squadron will go through all the operational phases given enough 
time, but the variance is such that the impact is somewhere between a time varying factor 
and a fixed factor. The deployment phase was associated with the highest (positive) effects 
on RBA and maintenance phase the lowest. This finding aligns with general expectations 
and assumptions about how the different operational phases are prioritized in terms of 
manning and supply, every unit increase in a squadron’s AMEX score results in an increase 
in RBA rate by roughly 5 percentage points which is statistically relevant. 
 
 Model 3 Scatterplot Source: Director, Force Readiness 



















Table 3. Models 3, 4, and 5 
Model 3 4 5 
    
R Square 0.178 0.193 0.268 
Observations 708 708 708 
        
Parameter estimates       
       
Intercept 0.624*** 0.530***   
AMEX 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.059*** 
number_aircraft   0.009*** -0.002 
Basic     0.673*** 
Deployed     0.7515*** 
Integrated     0.706*** 
Maintenance      0.628*** 
Sustain     0.733*** 
        
Pr (>|t|) Significance Codes:  
*** = 0 to 0.001 / ** = 0.001 to 0.01 / * = 0.01 to 0.05 / . = 0.05 to 0.1 / blank = 0.1 to 1 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
We were able to use causal forecasting models to quantitatively show that there is 
a highly significant correlation between the experience of aviation maintainers and 
squadron readiness rates and the results answer our primary research question. Yes, the 
experience of aviation maintainers is relevant to Super Hornet readiness; an increase in 
experience corelates to an increase in readiness. Our findings were tested for fixed and 
random effects and the answers were not quantitatively different.  
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IV. LEVERAGING EXPERIENCE 
A. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
What follows is a description of methods that leverage the experience and 
knowledge of aviation personnel from different angles. The first is the Navy’s use of 
civilian subject matter experts. The second is a series of historical examples that highlight 
the impact of changing technology to aviation, and examples of specialization from the 
Navy and other branches of the DoD. The third is a review of practices taken from industry, 
which includes both the airlines and leaders in technology. This chapter culminates in a 
recommendation for the NAE.  
 Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command  
Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command (NATEC) can trace 
its origin back to 1942, shortly after Pearl Harbor, to the Airborne Coordinating Group 
(ACG) (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, n.d.). The increase in production of 
electronic equipment caused a gap in available skilled workforce, and the ACG was 
designed to respond to that need. The name has changed several times throughout the years 
and ultimately became NATEC in 1998 when the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit 
(NAESU) merged with Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSAF) and relocated to 
San Diego, California (Commander, Navy Region Southwest, n.d.). The mission has 
expanded from the original intent during the days of the ACG.  
In addition to providing naval engineering and technical assistance, its 
mission now includes providing technical support services in preparation, 
publication, and distribution to activities operating, maintaining, or 
manufacturing aircraft, guided missile target drones, and related equipment. 
(Commander, Navy Region Southwest, n.d.).  
To achieve this mission NATEC employs Naval Engineering Technical Support 
(NETS) from U.S. civil service and military personnel, and contractor engineering 
technical services (CETS) from non-DoD personnel. These experienced individuals work 
in teams to respond to requirements and requests from the fleet for assistance and training 
(Commander, Navy Region Southwest, n.d.). NATEC support is available for units at both 
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the organizational and intermediate levels to assist in the areas of avionics, airframes, 
electrical, power plants, and support equipment (J. Risser, PowerPoint Slides, April 21, 
2020). They provide training in the following ways: 
• On-the-job skill exchange 
• Just-in-time training 
• On-station troubleshooting 
• Distance support 
• Integrated weapons system reviews 
• Formal courses: corrosion, paint/final finish, battery safety, aircraft 
confined space (ACSP) 
• Support equipment and engine test cell qualifiers 
This training is not intended to be a substitute for formal training as described in 
Chapter II., but as a method for ensuring personnel are trained to the point of self-
sufficiency as described in the learning curve (J. Risser, PowerPoint Slides, April 21 2020). 
 Engineering and Technical Services (ETS) 
Requests for NATEC support are via requests for engineering technical services 
(ETS). NATEC is responsible for managing, controlling, and coordinating these requests, 
however, priorities for them are determined by the type commander (TYCOM), Fleet Air 
Forward (COMFAIRFWD), type wing (TYPEWING), U.S. Marine Forces Command/
Pacific/Reserve (COMMARFOR/COMMARFORES), Marine aircraft wing (MAW), and/
or the Commander, Fleet Readiness Center (COMFRC) (Commander, Naval Air Forces, 
2018).  
ETS should be requested to help develop self-sufficiency prior to 
deployment and minimize the use of ETS while deployed or during work-
up periods. (Commander Naval Air Forces, [CNAF] 2018)  
Among the numerous responsibilities of a squadron’s Maintenance Officer (MO) 
is the job of ensuring the proper utilization of NATEC personnel. As specified in the Naval 
Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP), “Use the on-site COMNAVAIRSYSCOM or 
NATEC field service representatives (as required) to effect liaison and support for the 
NAMP” (CNAF, 2017). 
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The method used in requesting a tech assist is dependent on the location of the 
requested help. If services are available locally then requests must be made via NATEC’s 
website ETS Local Assist Request (ELAR). A request for assistance where local service is 
not available, or if it is made away from the unit’s home base, requests are submitted via 
Naval Message (CNAF, 2018). The requirements become even more stringent for 
shipboard assistance requests.  
All training must be completed prior to an extended deployment so ETS 
support is not required after departure. Squadrons should coordinate ETS 
requirements with their MAW/air combat element (ACE)/carrier air wing 
(CVW) MO. MAW/ACE/CVW MOs will consolidate all squadron requests 
and pass them to the ship’s Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department 
(AIMD) officer. AIMD and the detachment MOs must gather ETS 
requirements as soon as feasible but should be submitted at least 30 days 
prior to at-sea periods. (CNAF, 2018)  
The need for NATEC services has grown over the years for F/A-18 Super Hornets 
(see Figure 20), and today these experts are more vital than ever to the success of the 
community. Reasons for the increased NATEC manhours in the super hornet community 
were not researched in this project; however, it is significant to note and compare Figure 
19 which shows NATEC manhours for all type model series (TMS) in the NAE to Figure 
20. Figure 19 does not show the same increasing manhour trend as the super hornets in 
Figure 20. This growth of NATEC support in the hornet community is an indicator of a 
possible increase in future need for NATEC services within the F/A-18 community.  
 
 NATEC Manhours for all NAE from 2008 to 2019. Source: 














 NATEC Manhours for F/A-18E/F from 2008 to 2019. 
Source: Adapted from NATEC (2020). 
 Specialization in the DoD 
The Navy’s system of identifying the jobs Sailors perform is tied to the name of 
their rating. Each rate has its own insignia and descriptive title, which may include a unique 
subspecialty. For example, an Aviation Boatswain’s Mate, Handling (ABH) is a subset of 
the Aviation Boatswain’s Mate rating. The ratings are used to distinguish the various 
professions among U.S. Navy enlisted personnel and have a long history of changing to 
adapt to the times. For instance, in the 1920s the Navy used the rating Airship Rigger, 
shown in Figure 21, since at the time the technology was deemed to have a long future in 
Naval Aviation. This rating was “responsible for maintaining the infrastructure of the 
dirigible and repaired any tears in the gas cells or skin.” (U.S. Naval Institute Staff, 2014) 
Dirigibles is a general term for any lighter-than-air craft, such as blimps, zeppelins, and 














 Airship Riggers aboard USS Macon in 1933. 
Source: U.S. Naval Institute Staff (2014). 
However, in 1948, once the Navy decided the future of dirigibles was not in 
alignment with where naval aviation was heading, this rating was disestablished, and the 
airship program was abandoned entirely in 1961. This is merely one example of a change 
made to a rating that was in response to a technology shift; there are many others such as 
the Aviation Carpenter’s Mate, whose importance is illustrated in Figure 22, was a 
predecessor of the modern AM rate, and the International Business Machine (IBM) 
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Operator, a forerunner of the Information Systems Technician (IT) (U.S. Naval Institute 
Staff, 2014).  
 
 USS Langley Launching a Mostly Wooden DT-2. 
Source: U.S. Naval Institute Staff (2014). 
Changes to Navy ratings are not only made in response to major changes in 
technology. They can also occur due to manpower restructuring, which can necessitate 
consolidation from many rates into one, as was the case with Storekeepers (SK), Aviation 
Storekeepers (AK), and Postal Clerks (PC) merging into a singular Logistics Specialist 
(LS) rating in 2003 (NAVADMIN 023/00). Restructuring may also occur as a combination 
of consolidation and specialization as it did in 2005 in the enlisted Aircrew (AW) 
community. NAVADMIN 092/05 changed and consolidated what had previously been a 
community divided into two categories. Prior to this change the term Aircrew, when 
referencing enlisted Sailors, could be for the Aviation Warfare Systems Operators who 
were primarily concerned with operations and tactics during flights as well as maintenance 
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rated Sailors who primarily serviced and repaired the aircraft but also served as aircrew 
during flights as well.  
THE CONSOLIDATION OF ALL ENLISTED HELICOPTER AIRCREW 
INTO THE AVIATION WARFARE SYSTEMS OPERATOR RATING 
HAS BEEN APPROVED. AS AN ELEMENT OF NAVY’S HUMAN 
CAPITAL STRATEGY, THIS CONSOLIDATION MARKS A MAJOR 
MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF NAVAL ROTARY AVIATION 
AND HELICOPTER AIRCREW CULTURE. IT PREPARES THE 
INVENTORY AND BILLET BASE FOR THE CONVERSION TO THE 
MH-60R AND MH-60S MULTI-MISSION PLATFORMS AND 
IMPROVES THE EFFICIENCY OF THE AIRCREW ACCESSION AND 
TRAINING PIPELINE. (NAVADMIN 092/05) 
The NAVADMIN’s acknowledgement of both training efficiency and new 
helicopters replacing older models is particularly interesting as we find ourselves in the 
beginning stages of transitioning from F/A-18s to F-35s. It is also interesting that the 
phased approach which began in 2005 was completed in 2008 with the release of 
NAVADMIN 152/08.  
THIS CONSOLIDATION MARKS A MAJOR MILESTONE IN  
THE EVOLUTION OF NAVAL AVIATION AND AIRCREW 
CULTURE. ESTABLISHING A SINGLE AIRCREW GENERAL 
RATING WILL ELIMINATE INEFFICIENCIES IN THE TRAINING 
PIPELINE, IMPROVE ADVANCEMENT QUALITY, PROVIDE MORE 
CONTROL OF THE NAC ENLISTED FORCE AND IMPROVE 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CAREER MANAGEMENT. 
(NAVADMIN 152/08) 
The description of changes to rates was done in order to establish a baseline of 
historical precedence within the Navy. However, changes to military jobs to leverage or 
consolidate knowledge and experience through specialization is not unique to the Navy. 
The other branches have successfully leveraged the knowledge and experience of their 
workforce in a similar manner.  
The Army goes as far as having a rank called “specialist” which has undergone 
many changes over the years. In 1920, the consolidation of 128 different rank insignias and 
titles into seven sparked the need to identify support soldiers with expertise in each field 
(Milzarski, 2018). The result was the “private/specialist.” Although the nature of the role 
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continued to be that of an expert within a particular field, the rank expanded until between 
1959 and 1968 a soldier could rise to the rank of E-9 as a specialist. However, just as 
previously described with the Navy, nothing is permanent with manpower. These years 
represent the apex of a specialist within the Army, and its rank structure began to decrease 
until 1985 when only one rank, the Spec/4, has remained since (Milzarski, 2018).  
The Army, Navy, and Air Force have experimented with specialization of pilots to 
varying degrees. The Navy briefly included warrant officers as pilots (NAVADMIN 031/
06; NAVADMIN 192/13) in a manner similar to the Army’s use of flying warrants. The 
Army makes a clear distinction between its aviator groups, and warrant officers continue 
to be specialists in flying aircraft (Figure 23) while traditional line officers focus on 
administrative and leadership skills in addition to flying and are thereby more generalists 
at flying (Marshburn & Rollin, 2005).  
 
 Mississippi National Guard’s First AH-64 Apache Pilot, 
WO1 Jessi McCormick. Source: Clarion Ledger (2016). 
However, despite this known difference between the two groups, a 2005 study by 
Marshburn and Rollin concluded that “commissioned officer and warrant officer aviators 
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do not significantly differ in their overall motivational orientations, their preferences for 
future flight experience, or their expectations of future flight experience” (Marshburn and 
Rollin, 2005, paragraph 1). The study utilized a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) and hierarchical linear regression models on a dataset of responses from 
116 Army commissioned officers and warrant officers participating in the Initial Entry 
Rotary Wing (IERW) aviator course at Fort Rucker, AL.  
Based on their dual motivational orientations, both commissioned officer 
and warrant officer aviators will thrive in work settings where both intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivators are available. Specifically, they will likely seek 
opportunities for competence, challenge, and enjoyment while focusing on 
income goals, promotion goals, and the potential for recognition for their 
efforts. (Marshburn and Rollin, 2005, paragraph 18)  
The findings of this study conflict with the Air Force’s results of an attempt at 
specialization for their pilots. Air Mobility Command briefly experimented with a flying-
only program they called the Aviator Technical Track from 2018 to 2020 before canceling 
the program after only getting two applicants. The goal of the program was to help alleviate 
pilot shortages within the Air Force and is summarized in this quote from an Air Mobility 
Command spokeswoman, “The bottom line is, there just wasn’t the appetite there for the 
program” (Losey, 2020, paragraph 3).  
 Industry 
The methods of leveraging experience vary across different business sectors and 
the details of most industry career paths are closed source and not available for public 
consumption. However, we were able to find many successful business practices and 
philosophies that differ in approach to application of manpower from the NAE.  
In answering the question of how to leverage the experience of manpower, one 
management expert stood out as the leader on this subject. Peter Drucker is considered by 
many to have written some of the most influential management philosophy followed by 
today’s industry. Looking through the lens of leveraging experts, Mr. Drucker in his 1967 
book, The Effective Executive wrote about a concept of the knowledge worker. 
Knowledge workers do not produce a “thing.” They produce ideas, 
information, concepts. The knowledge worker, moreover, is usually a 
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specialist. In fact, he can, as a rule, be effective only if he has learned to do 
one thing very well; that is, if he has specialized. (Drucker, 1967, p. 61) 
This idea behind a knowledge worker is having someone who holds the capital, or 
the knowledge, of how to perform a task extremely well. It is important to note the 
difference between a knowledge worker and manual laborer. Manual labor is a task 
performed by a person at one specific location, for example a factory floor; this person is 
not mobile, and their results require the capital, or tools, of the factory to produce those 
results. On the other hand, the knowledge worker has the know-how in their mind; this 
knowledge is considered their capital they can apply physically with their hands. The key 
difference of the knowledge worker from the manual laborer is they are mobile and can 
move to any location to produce results (Drucker, 1999, p. 87). Drucker further refers to 
these individuals as technologists. Technologists can be many different occupations; some 
examples include surgeons, plumbers, and aviation maintainers. Technologists own their 
means of production; this means of production is the knowledge in their head. Drucker 
further explains that these technologists should be treated as assets (Drucker, 1999, pp. 87–
89). He uses “asset “as meaning something that produces an outcome, for example an 
aviation maintainer uses their maintenance knowledge through their hands to produce the 
outcome of a fixed aircraft. While referring to a person as an asset may seem derogatory, 
Mr. Drucker was making the point that the companies should be investing in these 
individuals since they are the company’s capital producers. Management should be placing 
value on their knowledge workers by investing in them through higher education or 
financial incentives (Drucker, 1999, pp. 84, 87–88, 94).  
an organization is effective only if it concentrates on one task. 
Diversification destroys the performance capacity of an organization. 
(Drucker, 1992, paragraph 35) 
Commercial enterprises understand the importance of the knowledge worker; 
however, how to leverage this talent is not as clear-cut as the concept. A typical career path 
in industry may work something like this: an employee becomes good in their job to a point 
of specialization and performs above her peers. When this employee performs well her 
boss will want to reward her with more money or a promotion. If she keeps performing 
well at her job and becomes a superstar, she will eventually be promoted into the 
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management office. Management positions are the typical incentive companies use for 
their best employees (Benson et al., 2019). However, becoming a manager does not always 
leverage the knowledge worker and in some cases may take the worker out of the very 
specialization that made them successful in the first place.  
The “Peter Principle” is a theory that addresses this typical career progression to 
management. This principle suggests that the skills that made a worker successful at one 
level do not dictate the success they will have at the next level. Bluntly stated, people are 
promoted to their highest level of incompetence (Peter, 1969, p. 173). This theory comes 
from Dr. Laurence Peter in his 1969 book The Peter Principle, and although there was no 
statistical data to validate his theory at the time it was published, it was believed by many 
to hold true. Not all people are meant to be managers, some are very good at performing 
specialized tasks and may benefit from staying in those specialized roles.  
In 2019, professors Benson, Li, and Shue provide an empirical test of the Peter 
Principle. Their research demonstrates that people who worked in sales were either 
promoted to management based on their sales numbers or on being a good salesperson, and 
that specialization of being a good salesperson did not always translate into being a good 
manger (Benson et al., 2019).  
Figure 24 Graph A shows a positive correlation between sales and the probability 
of being promoted to manager. Graph B shows a negative correlation between sales and 
manger value added (Benson et al., 2019, Figure II). The researchers concluded, “We 
estimate that the costs of promoting workers with lower managerial potential are high” 
(Benson et al., 2019, Abstract). Their research also identified that incentives, pay, and 
status to advance to a management position were high. Therefore, the best salespeople were 
incentivized to be a manager and were not as equally incentivized to stay and improve in 




 Probability of Promotion and Manager Value Added. 
Source: Benson et al. (2019, Figure II). 
We agree that it can reasonably be assumed if aviation maintainers were used in 
place of salespeople in Benson, Li, and Shue’s research that the NAE would have similar 
results. The outcome would show that promoting the best technicians in squadrons does 
not always translate to a successful First-Class Petty Officer or Chief. Further dissecting 
this assumption, one could also say, that by promoting the best technician on the floor to 
management can further degrade a squadron by removing that superior technician from the 
maintenance floor.  
In this project a specialist is defined as a worker that is judged on results from their 
own personal efforts whereas a manager is judged on their ability to move a team to 
complete a task. These are two inherently different functions. Industry, especially the 
technology sector, has acknowledged that specialists can produce some amazing end-
results when they are allowed to work in their passions and are incentivized correctly. 
Further, industry has recognized the need for two career paths for individuals, a 
management track and a specialist’s track see Figure 25 (Tiffan, 2009). 
53 
 
 Example of a Two-Career Track. Source: Love (2018). 
The difficulty in a two-career path model is that there is not one “right” way to map 
out the career of a specialists because the needs are so different from company to company. 
Figure 26 and Table 4 show some of this difference between two technology companies’ 
approach on the subject. In addition, industry does not typically release career track 
information for public consumption for various reasons, the most obvious of which is 
wanting to have an edge over their competition. Therefore, it was difficult to find a concrete 
career road map for the NAE to follow; however, the concepts from this section can be 
used to justify looking at a change in the approach of an aviation maintainer’s career path. 
Recognizing the importance of a specialist, or knowledge worker, and that not everyone 





 Spotify Career Steps Individual. Source: Goldsmith (2016). 
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Table 4. Buffer Careers for Makers. Source: Griffis (2019).  
 
 
 Google: The Individual Contributor 
A specialist is identified by different names depending on the business sector. The 
technology industry uses the terms individual contributors and makers; manufacturing-
based businesses uses principle engineers; and the medical and financial industries refer to 
them as practitioners. However, a business may refer to a specialist the philosophy is the 
same; it is the idea of the knowledge worker as someone who uses their experience and 
knowledge via their hands to produce results.  
Google is well known for facilitating a culture of innovation and is an excellent 
example of a company that celebrates their specialist or as they call them, individual 
contributors. Two legendary employees who have stamped their names on the company 
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are Jeff Dean and Sanjay Ghemawat. They are both Google Senior Fellows, the top tier 
engineer within the organization, and are responsible for some of the most innovative 
creations at the company, both are considered individual contributors (Somers, 2018). It is 
no secret that Google facilitates a unique work environment for its employees to leverage 
their creative ideas to drive results. The specifics of the individual contributor career track 
are somewhat secretive, but the company has figured out a way to capture and invigorate 
what an individual mind can bring to the table by allowing employees to work within their 
passion in a creative work environment that emphasizes collaboration. (Stewart, 2013) Mr. 
Dean and Mr. Ghemawat are examples of success stories that occur when trying to emulate 
the idea of specialization. Both men have been at Google for around 20 years running small 
teams that work on some of the company’s most pressing issues, like artificial intelligence 
and software systems (Dean, n.d.; Ghemawat, n.d.).  
These excellent examples show that Google has figured out how to leverage 
specialization in their employees and make the utmost of creative minds. The company’s 
culture has created one of the most profitable companies in the U.S. Google’s parent 
company, Alphabet, reported a little over 46 billion in revenue for the fourth quarter in 
2019 (Elias, 2020). The results prove that Google is doing something right in how they 
leverage their employees’ skills, and it gives the NAE an example of how they may 
consider using individual contribution when solving Naval Aviation’s most pressing 
issues. 
While tech companies provide great examples of how to leverage talent, they also 
have an abundance of resources to pay for that talent and have different goals than the 
NAE, therefore it may not be 100 percent practical to incorporate their concepts when it 
comes to aviation maintenance. Fortunately creating specialist roles to leverage experience 
in companies is not a new phenomenon left only to Silicon Valley. 
 American Airlines: Technical Crew Chief 
One interest area that was sought out for replication purposes was the airline 
industry, which share the same goal with the NAE of flying safe aircraft efficiently. 
Different airline representatives were contacted during research of this project, and all 
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mentioned having specialists to support operations. One that stood out from the rest was 
American Airlines, who for the most part uses aviation technicians in the same way as the 
NAE. One example is American Airlines’ Crew Chiefs, who perform very similar roles as 
Navy Chief Petty Officers, they assign work and are expected to have a superior level of 
maintenance knowledge (American Airlines, 2020, p. 21). Another example is their 
Aviation Maintenance Technicians (AMTs), who perform a similar role to our E6 and 
below maintainers but have a more generalized role then the specificity of naval aviation 
rates (American Airlines, 2020, p. 24). However, American Airlines differs from the NAE 
in the way they employ a specialist or resident expert. They refer to this specialist as a 
Technical Crew Chief.  
The Technical Crew Chief will provide technical assistance, guidance, and 
training support to the Technical Operations department. In those cases 
where management determines that the work to be performed requires a 
level of responsibility equivalent to that of a Technical Crew Chief, an 
employee in the classification may be assigned to that function even though 
he has no other employees assigned directly to him. (American Airlines, 
2020, p. 23) 
This individual’s experience is leveraged with the expectation that they assist with 
maintenance up and down the flight line at airports all around the world. Their job is not 
to supervise a team, but instead to be a technical expert and assist AMTs and Crew Chiefs 
with some of the more difficult jobs. This person in theory should have superior knowledge 
of the aircraft to assist other maintainers on the flight line, without the added burden of 
supervising a crew. The technical crew chiefs experience and knowledge is leverage by the 
company to provide safe reliable aircraft to its customers. American Airlines seems to have 
recognized the importance of expertise and pays to have employees in that specific role 
giving the NAE an example and road map to a career track the Navy can duplicate 
(American Airlines, 2020). 
B. CONCLUSION 
In answer to our secondary research question—How can we best leverage the 
connection between maintainer experience and readiness in terms of manpower in the 
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aviation maintenance community?—our research concluded that utilizing a specialist 
career track is the best answer.  
NATEC is the current go-to source for technical experts in the NAE. However, 
their available pool of expertise is limited by the need for requests for support that come 
from the fleet via ETS in lieu of their continual involvement. When requested, their experts 
come to the aid of squadrons in a similar fashion as the Technical Crew Chiefs used by 
American Airlines, but with notable differences. NATEC emphasizes developing self-
sufficiency prior to extended deployment whereas Technical Crew Chiefs have no such 
stipulations and go wherever the most complicated and pressing maintenance issues are 
located. NATEC also provides supplemental training with relevant OJT if requested while 
Technical Crew Chiefs are solely focused on resolving the problem with the aircraft.  
Bearing this in mind, the role of a Technical Crew Chief is similar to the description 
of a specialist in the Army. Leveraging a specialist for their knowledge recognizes their 
experience comes from years of invested training and focus on their specific skill set. Naval 
aviation does not currently have a specialist in this same capacity; however, if we employ 
the Peter Principle and the concepts of Peter Drucker the ability to create a specialist from 
our current manpower becomes apparent. Successfully developing and retaining a 
specialist would require utilizing a two-career track that supports both the aptitude and 
desire of an individual for their career to lead into becoming either management or a 
specialist.  
A specialist within the NAE would need the same flexibility as NATEC personnel 
have by not being assigned to a squadron, while also providing continual support 
availability like a Technical Crew Chief with American Airlines. We further explore our 




V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This chapter recapitulates key points from our research, provides conclusions, 
makes recommendations, and identifies areas for further study. 
Our research was driven by close personal experience and missed opportunities we 
have witnessed first-hand. We addressed our research questions, explained the 
methodology for approaching those questions, and culminated with the research layout.  
A detailed review was conducted on the DEMOT rates, which included their rank 
structure, education, and methods currently in place that grow their occupational 
experience. The AMEX system is introduced and explained to provide knowledge on the 
primary database used in our research. The literature identified how experience can be 
measured, which included a brief explanation of learning curve models. We finished 
Chapter II with information on emerging technology and how it might relate to the military.  
Chapter III analyzed two years of VFA squadron data from AMSRR and AMEX 
databases. We used linear regression models to quantitatively show a highly significant 
correlation between the experience of aviation maintainers and squadron readiness rates. 
The result answered our primary research question, and concluded that the experience of 
aviation maintainers is relevant to Super Hornet readiness; an increase in experience 
corelates to an increase in readiness. Our findings were tested for fixed and random effects 
and the answers were not quantitatively different. 
Several examples of how to leverage experience were taken from naval history, 
other branches of the DoD, and industry that could be incorporated into the NAE. It also 
contained research on NATEC which, in our opinion, is the NAE’s current way of 
leveraging experience since it provides squadrons access to civilians with many years of 
aviation maintenance experience. Of note, Figure 20 in Chapter IV shows an upward trend 
in usage of NATEC civilians by the super hornet community, which indicates an increased 
need for experts with specialization. A significant highlight from industry was their 
emphasis that not everyone is meant to be manager, and a talented person with critical skills 
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should be treated as an asset best kept in their specialization. Industry uses various names, 
like individual contributor in the technology sector or practitioners in the medical field, but 
the philosophy remains the same in keeping talent where they are best utilized. One of the 
most important takeaways from this section was the American Airlines Technical Crew 
Chief, which is commercial aviation’s version of a specialist. The technical crew chief is 
an experienced aviation technician with a role of fixing aircraft without the burdens of 
management, and provides the NAE with a road map for creating a specialist in the Naval 
Aviation Maintenance community.  
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Primary Research Question 
 Conclusion 
Our primary research question asked: To what degree does the experience level of 
an aviation maintainer affect the readiness of an F/A-18 Super Hornet Squadron? There is 
a highly significant correlation between the experience of aviation maintainers and 
squadron readiness rates. Every unit increase in a squadron’s AMEX score results in an 
increase in RBA rate by roughly 5 percentage points. We derived this by using multiple 
regression models on a combined data set that contained monthly averages of AMEX 
scores and RBA rates from all non-FRS CONUS based VFA squadrons. We tested our 
results against fixed and random effects and found that the answers were not quantitatively 
different. 
 Recommendation 
We recommend the NAE increase utilization of the AMEX system across all 
aircraft platforms and it becomes the standard database TYCOMs use to balance out 
manning among squadrons. We further recommend Navy Personnel Command aviation 
detailers utilize AMEX with squadron AMO’s when working the detailing process to 
promote a balance of talent across the NAE.  
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 Secondary Research Question 
 Conclusion 
Our secondary research question asked: How can we best leverage the connection 
between maintainer experience and readiness in terms of manpower in the aviation 
maintenance community?” Our research concluded that establishing a specialist career 
track would have a positive effect on NAE readiness. 
 Recommendation 
We recommend CNAF works in conjunction with CNATRA, NATEC, and 
CNATT to create a specialist career track for aviation maintainers that takes the best 
methods from current and historical specialization in the military along with successful 
practices from industry to create a unique role that is suited to the dynamic needs of the 
NAE. In the following paragraphs we have described how this specialist career path could 
be employed and implemented in the fleet.  
We suggest offering a two-career track option to E-6 Sailors in the AD, AE, AM 
and AT rates. We excluded AOs on the basis that squadrons already have a Gunner who in 
many cases already takes the role of a specialist. The first track would be the continuation 
of the traditional career, which inevitably leads into management; and the second track, 
would lead to becoming a specialist. Targeting this critical time of around 10 years of 
service in a Sailors career is key because they are typically proficient technicians with 
plenty of time left to serve in their military career. The selection process should be a 
stringent review that includes both a review of their qualification record and an on-site 
evaluation of their work performance. Imagine the precision associated with the Blue 
Angels flight demonstrations, then associate that with welding, wire harness repair, and 
other tasks our specialists will perform. Simply stated, the overall standard of a specialist 
needs to be very high; and flexibility to remove Sailors who do not uphold those standards, 
and return them to the traditional career track, should be incorporated into the process. 
Part of aviation maintenance culture is the pride that Sailors associate with their 
rate and the importance that comes with identifying a Sailor with that rate. As such, we 
recommend rebranding specialists with ratings already recognized within the existing 
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construct. For example, a first-class petty officer selected for the specialist career track that 
was previously either an AE1 or AT1 would become an AV1. Similarly, an AM1, AME1, 
or AD1 would become an AF1. This nod to the rate change that normally occurs at E-9 
would be more than ceremonious in that it would carry the prestige associated with being 
on an elite team whose members are chosen through a highly competitive selection process 
and recognized for their top talent throughout the fleet.  
Once selected, these Sailors are identified as specialists within their specific TMS. 
The addition of a closed loop NEC, which would include a HYT waiver, would be added 
to their record. This waiver would alleviate concerns over HYT regulations and potentially 
retain talented Zone B Sailors who tend to leave the Navy to pursue a career in industry at 
potentially higher salaries and job security. Advancement will not be critical to the 
development of a specialist, instead they would remain at the rank of E6 and be incentivized 
with bonuses yearly for performance and results. If the Sailor is performing well as a 
specialist then they should be paid well and could continue to serve and complete a 30-year 
career at this rank.  
NATEC, as talked about previously in this project, is the Navy’s current source for 
experts. Leveraging that expertise should be a priority with any specialist’s career track. 
Having a specialist in every squadron is not meant to replace NATEC; it is leverage them 
more then we currently do. As we have shown in the trends there is growing need for their 
expertise, we would want our specialists to further integrate with NATEC civilians. 
Therefore, we would propose that the specialist work for and are managed by NATEC. We 
envision specialists distributed through TAD assignments to a squadron for four to five-
year tours, but would report to, and be evaluated by, the local NATEC OIC.  
This command structure of working for a squadron but reporting to NATEC would 
be done for three main reason:  
• First, creating a line of communication between the squadrons and 
NATEC civilian experts more robust then we currently have is ideal. A 
specialist that reports to and is evaluated by the NATEC OIC would 
63 
enforce this line of communication, therefore leveraging the expertise that 
already exists within the NAE.  
• Second, being evaluated by the NATEC OIC would allow the specialist to 
focus on being a technician and not getting bogged down with squadron 
politics of the evaluation cycle. 
• Third, this would allow an additional flow of information from squadrons 
to the NAE through NATEC of the fleet’s most pressing maintenance 
issues and solutions.  
Each squadron would be billeted one specialist, assigned to a position equivalent 
of their rank. For example, an AV1 would fill the slot of any DEMOT E6 billet on the 
squadron manning document, therefore not adding any additional cost to the manpower 
footprint. The specialist will be the squadron’s knowledge worker, and can therefore extend 
that knowledge to each of the different shops. This one person will be the go-to source for 
perplexing maintenance issues, and would have the full network support of other specialists 
and NATEC without the barrier that deployment presents currently. A requirement for 
more than one specialist within a squadron should not be needed since their focus is not on 
routine maintenance, and having more than one risks diluting the intent of their position.  
When we researched companies about specialists and how they leveraged expertise 
it was emphasized that having clear-cut expectations was key. It is absolutely necessary 
that leadership from the highest level in the NAE have clear expectations of what this 
Sailor’s role and responsibilities would, and would not, include. Below are some of our 
ideas on what the expectations of the specialists would be: 
• Upon selection, a specialist must complete a one-year probationary tour at 
an FRC, under the close supervision of NATEC, would ensure the selectee 
met the standard and expectations of becoming a specialist. 
• Continually improve their maintenance knowledge of existing technology 
installed on the aircraft, technology soon to be incorporated via technical 
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directive, and emerging technology with potential impact on their specific 
TMS specialty. 
• Maintain a clear and current understanding of the readiness goals and 
concerns of their TMS within the NAE. 
• Focus on improving readiness and NAE maintenance concerns of their 
TMS and work diligently to develop solutions. 
• Must actively utilize the civilian experts from NATEC and learn from 
them daily. The idea here is one day those experts are going to retire and 
we must siphon as much knowledge from them as possible. Todays 
enlisted specialists are the future and will be tomorrows NATEC civilian 
experts. 
If we are going to have an elite group of technicians, we are going to have to pay 
or incentivize these experts. While it is typical to brush off an idea when increased cost 
becomes a factor, we would argue in this case we are paying for increased readiness. If the 
ability to pay out bonuses and leverage incentives was left in NAE leadership hands, they 
could reward specialists for meeting and exceeding the expectations set forth by them. 
Below is a list of incentives we believe would create enough of a splash to attract and retain 
the right talent: 
• Once a Sailor has been selected as a specialist and completes their 
probationary period at an FRC they would be awarded a $30,000 initial 
bonus, and an increase of $10,000 in addition to their current pay for each 
following year of service as a specialist.  
• Additional bonuses attainable for finding solutions to fleetwide problems, 
outstanding improvement to squadron readiness numbers, or developing 
patents.  
• All expenses paid for relevant education. For example, A&P licensing or 
aviation welding schools. This would incentivize specialty trades 
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education and certifications, not traditional education programs like BA or 
master’s programs.  
• Flexibility in location preference, and if flexibility is not available at the 
time, bonuses and incentive pay for less than desirable locations.  
• Specialists would be exempt from being assigned collateral duties and any 
other task unassociated with maintenance since it would distract from their 
unique role, would not factor into their performance, and would impair the 
ability of traditional career track Sailors to gain the benefit of having 
them. 
We realize this may be seen as excessive by some in the NAE, but the courses we 
have taken at NPS have shown that individuals are motivated by different factors. 
Combining monetary incentives with job flexibility and non-traditional educational 
opportunities would provide a sufficient incentive for the Sailors to risk pursing a new 
rating and career track. We were given the opportunity to attend NPS and believe it is our 
responsibility to give the NAE a different way a thinking about a problem. In developing 
these specialist rates, we believe our future technology and readiness issues can be solved 
by approaching the problem in a different manner and leveraging the talent that already 
exists within the NAE. Far too often the Navy funds projects that aim to do more with less; 
what we propose is doing more with what we already have available.  
C. FURTHER RESEARCH  
Due to the nature of completing an MBA project we had to narrow the scope of our 
research to make it feasible to complete within the timeline available. However, there are 
many avenues still to be explored and additional questions we would have pursued if they 
had not gone beyond the scope of our project and time permitted.  
Our research focused on the F/A-18 community due to being naval aviation’s 
primary platform with sufficient AMEX data available to put to use, however, once AMEX 
is more established with-in other communities it would be beneficial to perform similar 
analyses on them. The F/A-18 community is the largest within the NAE, but the lessons 
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learned from analyzing their AMEX scores and readiness numbers should not be assumed 
to be applicable for all platforms.  
We recommend performing a cost benefit analysis (CBA) on our recommendations, 
since performing one in this project would have amounted to an additional MBA project 
of its own. However, a CBA would be extremely useful to the NAE since moving forward 
with the creation of a specialist career track would come at an opportunity cost that should 
be measured against current practices.  
Optimization research could be performed to determine which of the recommended 
versions of a specialist track would be the most beneficial to the NAE. A study may 
conclude the best way to implement the specialist career track within the enlisted aviation 
maintenance ranks, or it may counter our conclusion and argue that current policies are the 
optimal method. Either way, the Navy would reap the benefit of the research.  
While writing this we are in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, and it affects 
everyone in different ways, but one of the worst hit sectors is the U.S. airlines industry. In 
the maintenance departments of commercial aviation many layoffs have occurred while the 
departments have been expected to perform the same amount of maintenance, especially 
at the MRO depot-equivalent level. The results and data are inconclusive today, but the 
airlines maintenance teams so far seem to have performed well and are keeping up with 
demand with less people. After the pandemic is over there may be area for future research 
on this subject to see if working with less people helped or hurt the airlines while keeping 
up with demand. If they do perform well with less manpower, gathering lessons learned as 
to why could be beneficial to the NAE.  
There are major concerns in the civilian aviation maintenance community that 
many technicians should be retiring soon without equivalent younger replacements. This 
concern may be an issue within NATEC for the Navy if we are not prepared for it. Research 
is recommended in how retirement numbers may affect our ability to retain talented 
aviation technicians.  
Lastly, we were unable to turn the NATEC data into a covariate within our 
regression models since the requests, which come from the Wing, could not be reliably 
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split into individual squadron without making more assumptions than we deemed suitable. 
We would have preferred to have tested how much NATEC assistance factored into an 
increase in readiness numbers but given the time necessary to do so we were unable to 
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APPENDIX.  AVIATION PRODUCTION RATINGS. 
Aviation Machinist’s Mate (AD)  
Aviation Machinist’s Mates (AD) maintain, inspect, troubleshoot, preserve, 
and de-preserve aircraft transmission systems, rotor systems, propeller 
systems, and engines, including fuel, lubrication, intake, compressor, 
combustion, turbine, exhaust, accessory gearbox, anti-ice, bleed air 
systems, etc.; conduct special and conditional inspections and oil analysis; 
perform functional checks and required adjustments on engines and related 
systems; and supervise and provide training to power plant work centers. 
(DoN, 2020a, AD-3) 
 
Aviation Electrician’s Mate (AE) 
Aviation Electrician’s Mates (AE) maintain electrical and instrument 
systems, including power generation, conversion, and distribution systems, 
aircraft batteries, and interior and exterior lighting; and maintain electrical 
control of aircraft systems, including hydraulic, landing gear, flight control, 
utility, and power plant engine, flight and non-instrument-type indicating 
and warning systems, automatic flight control and stabilization systems, 
aircraft compass systems, attitude reference systems, inertial navigation 
systems, and environmental control systems. (DoN, 2020a, AE-3) 
 
Aviation Structural Mechanic (AM)  
Aviation Structural Mechanics (AM) maintain aircraft airframe and 
structural components, flight surfaces and controls, hydraulic and 
pneumatic control and actuating systems and mechanisms, landing gear 
systems, air conditioning, pressurization, visual improvement, oxygen and 
other utility systems, egress systems including seat and canopy ejection 
systems and components, fabricate and repair metallic and nonmetallic 
materials; supervise operation of airframe work centers; maintain aircraft 
metallic and non-metallic structures including fuselages, fixed and 
moveable flight surfaces, tail booms, doors, panels, decks, empennages, and 
seats (except ejection seats); maintain flight controls and related 
mechanisms; maintain hydraulic power storage and distribution systems 
including main (primary and secondary), auxiliary (utility), and emergency 
systems; maintain hydraulic actuating subsystems; maintain landing gear 
systems including wheels and tires, brakes, and emergency systems; 
maintain pneumatic power, storage and distribution systems; maintain 
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hoists and winches, wing and tail fold systems; maintain launch and 
arresting gear systems; perform hydraulic component repair and testing; and 
perform aircraft daily, special, hourly, non-destructive, and conditional 
inspections. (DoN, 2020a, AM-3) 
 
Aviation Structural Mechanic (Safety Equipment) (AME)  
Aviation Structural Mechanics (Safety Equipment) (AME) maintain 
ejection seats, canopy jettison components, environmental control, fire 
extinguishing, and associated life support systems; maintain gaseous and 
liquid oxygen, cockpit pressurization, heating and cooling, ventilation 
systems, avionics cooling, and anti-gravity and control components; 
maintain utility systems and associated lines, fittings, rigging, valves, 
control mechanisms, oxygen gauges, converters, and regulators; inspect, 
remove, and install ejection seats, shoulder harnesses, and lap belts; inspect, 
remove, and install explosive devices; adjust canopy and ejection seat firing 
mechanisms; operate and maintain liquid oxygen, gaseous oxygen and 
nitrogen support equipment; and perform daily, pre-flight, post-flight, and 
other periodic aircraft inspections. (DoN, 2020a, AME-3) 
 
Aviation Ordnanceman (AO)  
Aviation Ordnancemen (AO) receive, inspect, package, store, handle, and 
process for shipment: airborne weapons, air launched torpedoes, aerial 
mines, sonobuoy, pyrotechnics and ammunition; maintain, test, assemble, 
load, download, arm, and de-arm all airborne weapons, aircraft gun 
systems, targets, sonobuoys, and pyrotechnics for aircraft carriage; receive, 
inspect, inventory, configure, test, and maintain Armament Weapons 
Support Equipment (AWSE), Ordnance Handling Equipment (OHE), 
Aircraft Armament Systems (AAS) and Materials Handling Equipment 
(MHE); test and maintain aircraft armament release and control systems; 
inspect and maintain conventional ordnance magazines and Ready Service 
Lockers (RSL); maintain and operate magazine sprinkler systems; maintain 
and operate cargo/weapons elevators; perform preventative maintenance 
and inventory small arms weapons; manage accounting systems, rework of 
airborne weapons/systems/equipment, and conventional weapons 
qualification/certification programs, afloat and ashore; and prepare, review, 
maintain, and inspect compliance with directives and reports applicable to 
Notice of Ammunition Reclassification (NAR), Hazards of Electromagnetic 
Radiation to Ordnance (HERO), weapons certification program, and 
explosive handling certification program. (DoN, 2020a, AO-4) 
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Aviation Electronics Technician (AT)  
Aviation Electronics Technicians (AT) perform intermediate level 
maintenance on aviation electronic components with conventional and 
automatic test equipment; repair Weapons Replaceable Assemblies (WRA) 
and Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRA); and perform test equipment 
calibration/repair and associated test bench maintenance. They also perform 
organizational level maintenance on aircraft electronics systems to include: 
computers, communications, Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR), 
navigation, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) sensors, fiber optics, Forward 
Looking Infrared (FLIR), wiring, weapons systems, Light Amplification by 
Stimulated Emission of Radiation (LASER), electronic warfare, data link, 
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